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Abstract: We introduce a novel time-frequency quantum key distribution
(TFQKD) scheme based on photon pairs entangled in these two conju-
gate degrees of freedom. The scheme uses spectral detection and phase
modulation to enable measurements in the temporal basis by means of
time-to-frequency conversion. This allows large-alphabet encoding to
be implemented with realistic components. A general security analysis
for TFQKD with binned measurements reveals a close connection with
finite-dimensional QKD protocols and enables analysis of the effects of
dark counts on the secure key size.
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1. Introduction
Light and matter are ultimately constituted of quantum entities, so that the limitations of tech-
nology cannot be prescribed by the principles of classical physics. Quantum-optical devices
promise better-than-classical performance in sensing [1, 2], computation [3, 4, 5] and, in par-
ticular, communications [6, 7]. Quantum effects in optical systems are easily observed at room
temperature because of the high carrier frequency of optical signals compared with thermal
background radiation. Light has numerous degrees of freedom that can be co-opted for the
transmission of quantum information, and optical signals can be generated and detected effi-
ciently. Modern telecommunications leverage the very large capacity of optical channels via
dense multiplexing techniques, and the efficiency of quantum information processing can be
similarly enhanced with the use of large-alphabet encoding strategies. In this connection, time-
frequency encoding offers numerous advantages over polarisation or spatial-mode encodings,
since multiple spectral modes are supported in waveguides and optical fibres with minimal dis-
persion, and zero cross-talk. For this reason, large-alphabet spectral-temporal multiplexing in
quantum optics has recently received growing attention [8, 9], with immediate applications in
quantum key distribution (QKD)[10, 11, 12].
Public key cryptography underpins much of commerce today [13], but it is threatened by the
advanced computational tools made possible by quantum information processing. Although a
quantum computer remains many years away, the threat is sufficient to motivate the search
for security that is immune to a quantum adversary. Quantum key distribution [14] provides
this security, and in the three decades since the first proposals were made based on polarized
photons [15], it has developed into both a burgeoning industry [16], and a diverse research field
[17, 18, 19, 20]. While polarisation states are vulnerable to corruption in waveguides and optical
fibres, the arrival time of photons is a more robust encoding [21]. In general, transmission losses
limit the range of QKD, but the use of entangled photons [22] allows the distance to be extended
by means of quantum repeaters [23, 24], which employ entanglement swapping between short
segments to distribute secure correlations over large distances.
These considerations motivate the study of QKD with photon pairs entangled in their chrono-
cyclic degree of freedom [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 8]. The security of such time-frequency QKD
(TFQKD) protocols is based on the ability to detect non-classical correlations in at least two
complementary measurement bases, and these bases should be mutually unbiased (i.e. Fourier
conjugates of one another) to maximise the sensitivity of the measured correlations to intru-
sion by an eavesdropper. Time and frequency domain detection provides a particularly con-
venient conjugate pair both because time- and frequency-resolving measurements are mature
technologies, and because photon sources based on parametric scattering, such as spontaneous
downconversion or four-wave mixing naturally produce photon pairs with widely-tunable cor-
relation properties ranging from uncorrelated emission [30, 31] to extremely broadband spectral
entanglement [32, 33, 34]. However, accessing the large entropy of these photon pairs requires
precise measurements in both time and frequency bases, which is a non-trivial problem because
of technical constraints on the timing jitter of photon detectors and the resolution of spectrom-
eters.
Recently it was proposed to use fast time-resolving photon detectors to record the correlated
arrival times of entangled photons, and to insert a dispersive medium before the detectors to
measure in the frequency basis [10]. The dispersion delays each spectral component of the in-
cident photons differently, converting the arrival time at the detector into a frequency measure-
ment [35]. This protocol has the advantage that a single detector can sample a large region in
chronocyclic space [36]. However the timing jitter of the detector sets a lower limit to the cor-
relation time of the photon pairs. Fast detectors are not yet efficient [37, 38], whereas efficient
detectors are generally slower [39, 40, 41], so with current technology the spectral correla-
tions should be very narrowband in order for the arrival-time correlations to extend over a long
enough period to be resolved by the detectors. Besides the challenges of engineering a bright
photon source to fit these criteria, the narrow bandwidth also means that extremely dispersive
media are required to implement the frequency measurements, which are generally lossy. It was
found in [10] that a photon efficiency of up to 2 bits per photon could be achieved with realistic
components.
Here we introduce an alternative large-alphabet entangled TFQKD protocol that is dual to
[10]. We propose to use spectral measurements to detect frequency correlations, and to use
phase modulators to convert these measurements to the time basis. We show that with this de-
tection scheme it is feasible to demultiplex up to 4 bits per photon with readily available com-
ponents, while technical advances — essentially improving the power dissipation of electro-
optical phase modulators to allow larger modulation depth — could allow much larger alpha-
bets. While chronocyclic entanglement produces correlations between the continuous variables
of arrival time and frequency, measurements inevitably map these correlations to a set of dis-
crete outcomes. We provide a security analysis that accounts for the effects of this detector-
binning, and we model the constraints on the secure key arising from dark counts.
2. The protocol
Fig. 1. Time-frequency quantum key distribution with spectrally entangled photon pairs.
Top: we assume a Gaussian anti-correlated joint spectral amplitude f (ω,ω ′) (left) and a
corresponding positively correlated Gaussian arrival time distribution f˜ (t, t ′) (right). Black
ruled lines indicate spectral/temporal measurements made by Alice and Bob centred at the
values {ω j}/{t j} (see text). Middle: photon pairs from the source are distributed to Alice
and Bob, who have identical measurement setups. Bottom: spectral correlations are re-
vealed with photon-counting spectrometers (spect). Security is certified by measurements
in the conjugate arrival-time basis using time-to-frequency conversion (TFC), which is im-
plemented with a dispersive element (disp) followed by a phase modulator (mod).
Key distribution aims at generating a pair of correlated random bit strings shared exclusively
by two parties — conventionally called Alice and Bob — that can be used to encrypt and
decrypt communications by means of a one time pad [42]. In our TFQKD protocol, Alice and
Bob construct correlated bit strings by recording the results of joint measurements on pairs of
spectrally entangled photons. The entanglement produces correlations in both the frequencies
and the arrival times of the photons which are destroyed if the system is measured by a third
party. Uncorrelated measurement results therefore reveal the presence of an eavesdropper (Eve)
when Alice and Bob compare a subset of their bits. As shown in Fig. 1, a parametric source
(which may or may not be under the control of Eve) produces photon pairs in the entangled
state (ignoring for the moment the emission of vacuum or double pairs)
|ψ〉=
∫ ∫
f (ω,ω ′)
∣∣ω,ω ′〉 dω dω ′, (1)
where |ω,ω ′〉 indicates a photon pair received by Alice and Bob with frequencies ω +ω0
and ω ′+ω0, respectively, with ω0 the central frequency of the pair. Here f (ω,ω ′) is the joint
spectral amplitude describing the frequency correlations between a photon pair emitted with
detunings ω , ω ′ from degeneracy. In general, energy conservation and phasematching consid-
erations produce non-factorable joint spectra, f (ω,ω ′) 6= fA(ω) fB(ω ′) [43, 44], and the degree
of entanglement — the number of correlated spectral modes — is conveniently quantified by
the Schmidt number K = 1/∑ j λ 4j , where the {λ j} are the singular values of f . Broad spectral
entanglement with K∼ 103 has been observed [45] and routes to extremely multimode emission
with K ∼ 107 have been proposed [34]. Therefore although source engineering is non-trivial, it
is already possible to produce photon pairs with a high degree of quantum correlations. As dis-
cussed above, the primary challenge for implementing TFQKD lies with the detection scheme.
In our protocol, Alice and Bob each have a photon-counting spectrometer, which they use to
measure the frequencies of their photons. A photon entering one of the spectrometers is spa-
tially dispersed and then directed towards one of M photon counting detectors, such that a
‘click’ at the jth detector ( j = 1,2, . . . ,M) is described by a projective positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) element
Π j =
∫
Fj(ω) |ω〉〈ω | dω. (2)
Here Fj is the instrument response that represents the finite resolution of the spectrometer —
that is, the range of frequencies coupled to the jth detector. For simplicity in the calculations to
follow we will assume a ‘top hat’ profile
Fj(ω) =
{
1 |ω−ω j| ≤ δω/2;
0 otherwise, (3)
with ω j = ω0 +[ j− (M+1)/2]δω . This describes a spectrometer with a resolution δω and a
flat response to all frequencies in the range ω0−∆ω/2≤ ω ≤ ω0+∆ω/2, where ∆ω = Mδω .
This description would be appropriate for a grating spectrometer equipped either with a photon
counting charge-coupled device (CCD), or a v-groove array of fibres coupled to Geiger-mode
avalanche photodiodes (APDs), for example [46]. The entanglement of the state in Eq. (1) will
cause correlated clicks at the outputs of Alice’s and Bob’s spectrometers, which they can use to
generate a cryptographic key. The frequency measurements have M possible outcomes, so that
a detection event can extract up to a maximum of IM = log2 M bits of information from each
photon pair.
However to certify the security of their key, they need to also check that the arrival times of
the photons are correlated. As mentioned previously, the large timing jitter (&200 ps for APDs)
of efficient photon-counting detectors makes it challenging to resolve the temporal correlations
directly. Instead, we propose to implement measurements in the time basis by sending each pho-
ton through a time-to-frequency converter [47, 48, 49]. As shown in Fig. 1, this comprises a dis-
persive element followed by a phase modulator, the combined effect of which is to implement
a Fourier transform on the incident waveform, thus converting time to frequency. The effect is
rigorously analogous to a spatial Fourier transform implemented on the transverse profile of a
light field using a lens followed by free-propagation over a distance equal to its focal length. To
see how this works, consider first the effect of the phase modulator on an incoming field (anal-
ogous to free propagation alone). The modulator imprints a sinusoidally time-varying1 phase
φ(t) = Acos(Ωt) with amplitude A and angular frequency Ω. Near the peak of the modulation
at t ≈ 0 the phase has a quadratic time dependence φ(t)≈−AΩ2t2/2=−φ¨ t2/2, where we have
defined φ¨ = AΩ2 and we dropped an unimportant global phase. The time-dependent amplitude
E(t) of the incident field is transformed to E(t)exp{iφ¨ t2/2}, which in frequency space induces
a transformation analogous to the Fresnel-Kirchhoff diffraction formula,
|ω〉 −→ (2piiφ¨)−1/2
∫
ei(ω−ω
′)2/2φ¨ ∣∣ω ′〉 dω ′. (4)
We now consider that the field has previously propagated through a system with quadratic,
or group velocity dispersion, which imparts a spectral phase ϕ(ω) = −ϕ ′′ω2/2 (analogous
to a lens). Inserting this phase and multiplying out the Gaussian exponent in Eq. (4), the full
transformation becomes
|ω〉 −→ (2piiφ¨)−1/2eiω2/2φ¨
∫
ei(1/φ¨−ϕ
′′)ω ′2/2e−iωω
′/φ¨ ∣∣ω ′〉 dω ′. (5)
The choice ϕ ′′ = 1/φ¨ corresponds to the spectral Fraunhofer limit [51] in which the quadratic
phase factor in the integrand of Eq. (5) is removed, and the transformation is then operationally
identical to a Fourier transform (the analogous cancellation of Fresnel diffraction in the focal
plane of a lens is well-known). That is, any measurement of the spectral intensity of the trans-
formed field is equivalent to a measurement of the temporal intensity — the arrival time — of
the input field, described by the POVM element
Π˜ j = (2piφ¨)−1/2
∫ ∫
F˜j(ω−ω ′) |ω〉
〈
ω ′
∣∣ dω dω ′, (6)
where we have defined
F˜j(x) = (2piφ¨)−1/2
∫
Fj(x′)e−ixx
′/φ¨ dx′ (7)
= δω(2piφ¨)−1/2e−iω jx/φ¨ sinc(xδω/2φ¨). (8)
The temporal resolution of this measurement is δ t = δω/φ¨ , where δω is the spectral resolution
of the photon-counting spectrometer, as described above. Note that this is independent of the
timing jitter of the photon counters used to register the photons. Like an ordinary spatial lens,
the time lens has a finite aperture τ , which is the region in time over which the phase modulation
remains quadratic. To a good approximation this is given by τ = 1/Ω [47]. This sets a limit to
how fast the modulator can be run, since the signals to be detected must pass through the
aperture within this time window.
Having described how to implement temporal measurements, we consider the parameters
required for an effective TFQKD protocol using our approach. As an idealised example, we
1Other phase modulation schemes such as four-wave mixing in waveguides [50] or sum-frequency generation in
nonlinear crystals [48] could of course be used. Here we consider electro-optic phase modulation, which can be imple-
mented with off-the-shelf telecoms components efficiently and with low loss.
assume a Gaussian correlated joint spectrum of the form [52, 53]
f (ω,ω ′) = (pi∆+∆−/8)−1/2 exp
(−ω2−/2∆2+−ω2+/2∆2−) , (9)
where ω± = (ω ±ω ′)/
√
2 and ∆+, ∆− are the marginal and correlation bandwidths, respec-
tively. The Schmidt number is given by 2K = ∆+/∆−+∆−/∆+, which is roughly the ratio
of the major and minor widths of the joint spectrum (see Fig. 1). This coincides with the in-
tuition that the number of correlated modes is found by dividing up the joint spectrum and
counting the number of bins of width roughly equal to the correlation bandwidth ∆−. To access
these correlated modes with our detectors, we engineer the source such that ∆− = β−δω and
∆+ = β+∆ω , where the constants β± are chosen so that the spectral resolution roughly matches
the correlation bandwidth, and the spectral response covers the full width of the joint spectrum.
For example, the choice β+ = 3/4 yields a reasonably flat marginal probability distribution
across all detection channels, while choosing β− = 1/5 provides sufficiently tight correlations
that cross-talk between channels is negligible.
The correlations in the time domain are determined by the joint temporal amplitude f˜ (t, t ′),
which is the two-dimensional Fourier transform of the joint spectral amplitude, f (ω,ω ′). The
form assumed in Eq. (9) is convenient because f˜ (t, t ′) is again a correlated Gaussian as shown
in Fig. 1, with major and minor temporal widths given by T± = 1/∆∓. If we require the same
ability to resolve temporal correlations as spectral correlations, we should have a temporal
resolution δ t = T−/β−, which fixes the modulator phase curvature to be
φ¨ =
δω
δ t
= ∆−∆+
= β+β−Mδω2. (10)
We also require that the temporal aperture of the modulator is long enough to accommodate the
full signal, τ ≥ T+, which limits the modulator frequency to
Ω≤ β−δω. (11)
Since the modulation frequency is restricted, the modulation depth A must be large enough to
achieve the required phase curvature. The demands on the modulation depth are minimised by
matching the modulator frequency and the spectrometer resolution to achieve equality in the
above condition. This can be achieved with modern GHz-bandwidth modulators and a rela-
tively modest grating spectrometer. For instance, using the choices for β± introduced above,
a 50 GHz modulator could be used with a 2 nm-resolution spectrometer and telecoms-band
photons. Operating at this limit, the modulation depth required to implement the time lens is
A =
β+
β−
M. (12)
This is a relatively demanding condition: the modulation depth must rise in proportion to the
number of frequency bins used for the QKD protocol. That is, exponentially in the number of
bits carried by each photon pair. However modulation depths of order 20pi radians are feasible
with lithium-niobate modulators [54], which would allow M = 16 (an alphabet size of IM = 4
bits per photon pair). We note finally that the dispersion required to reach the Fraunhofer limit
in this example would be provided by∼220 m of ordinary silica fibre, with a GVD on the order
of 300 fs2 cm−1. Such a short length of fibre would introduce very small losses.
3. Security
The output of TFQKD is a digital bit string, as for all QKD protocols, but this is extracted
from measurements on continuous degrees of freedom. Therefore it is not immediately obvi-
ous whether a security analysis developed for discrete-variable QKD protocols can be applied.
To examine the security of TFQKD with entangled photons, we adapt arguments developed
for spatially-encoded QKD [55] to the case of finite detector resolution [56, 57, 58, 59]. To
proceed, we consider the correlations revealed by the sifted joint probability distribution {pBAba }
describing the probability of Bob’s bth detector firing along with Alice’s ath detector, when both
measure in the frequency basis. These correlations are quantified by the mutual information IBA,
IBA =∑
ba
pBAba log2
(
pBAba
pBb p
A
a
)
, (13)
where pBb = ∑a p
BA
ba is the marginal distribution of Bob’s outcomes, and where p
A
a is similarly
Alice’s marginal distribution. For simplicity we suppose that Alice and Bob post-process their
sifted key bits using a one-way forward reconciliation protocol, for which the size — in bits —
of the secret key they can distill is bounded by the excess information
I = IBA− IBE,
where IBE is the mutual information between Bob and Eve2. We can calculate IBA from the
statistics of Alice’s and Bob’s measurements but IBE is not known and must be bounded by
analyzing the correlations in the complementary (temporal) basis. To proceed, we write the
mutual information in the form IXY = HX −HX|Y [55], where HX = −∑x pXx log2 pXx is the
marginal entropy and where the conditional entropy is given by
HX|Y =∑
y
pYy HX|Y=y, where HX|Y=y =−∑
x
pXYx|y log2 p
XY
x|y (14)
is the entropy associated with the conditional probabilities pXYx|y that the x
th detector of party X
fires, given that the yth detector of party Y fires. We then obtain
I = HB|E−HB|A. (15)
Next we need to find a lower bound for HB|E. To do this, we note that the variability of Bob’s
measurement results in time and frequency are restricted by Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle.
More generally, if Bob receives an arbitrary quantum state ρ , the marginal entropies HB(ρ)
(H˜B(ρ)) for Bob’s measurements in frequency (time), satisfy the entropic uncertainty relation
HB(ρ)+ H˜B(ρ)≥ B, (16)
where B is a number that depends only on Bob’s measurements, not on the state ρ . Alice’s and
Eve’s measurements on the state emitted by the source produce a conditional state ρB|A=a,E=e at
Bob’s detectors, so that we have HB(ρB|A=a,E=e) = HB|A=a,E=e, using a natural tripartite exten-
sion of the notation in Eq. (14). Substituting this conditional state into Eq. (16) and averaging
over the possible outcomes of Alice’s and Eve’s measurements, we obtain
HB|EA+ H˜B|EA ≥ B. (17)
2In general the key distillation will have non-unit efficiency β such that I = β IBA− IBE. However high efficiencies
can be achieved, with β > 90%, so that this represents a small correction. In any case, although the formulas are
simplified by assuming β = 1, our security analysis can be trivially extended to cover the general case.
Now, since uncertainty (entropy) is only increased by removing a “given” precondition from a
conditional distribution, we can remove Alice as a given from the first conditional entropy, and
Eve as a given from the second, to get
HB|E+ H˜B|A ≥ B. (18)
Inserting this into Eq. (15) gives
I ≥ B− H˜B|A−HB|A. (19)
The formula for the entropic bound is
B =−2log2 C, (20)
where C = max jk ||Π1/2j Π˜1/2k ||∞, with ||A||∞ denoting the largest singular value of the operator
A [60]. This bound is how the complementarity of the temporal/spectral measurement bases
underpins the security of the key. As shown in Appendix A, C is well approximated by the
quantity
√
δωδ t/2pi , so that finally the size of the secret key is
HB ≥ I ≥min
{
HB, log2
[
2pi
δωδ t
]
− H˜B|A−HB|A
}
, (21)
where we have included the natural constraint that the secret key is upper bounded by the
marginal entropy HB of the measurements (since HB|E≤HB). That is, regardless of the measure-
ment precision, the secret key cannot exceed the entropy of Bob’s marginal statistics. This is
in turn bounded from above by HB ≤ IM = log2 M, which is the maximum information content
for M-outcome measurements. By design M = (β+/2β−)K is roughly equal to the Schmidt
number of the source, to within a factor on the order of unity. With appropriate choices of β±
and for sufficiently resolving measurements (such that δωδ t ∼M−1), this protocol can there-
fore be efficient in terms of the information extracted from the quantum states it consumes as
a resource. For the modulation scheme described above, we have δ t = δω/φ¨ , which along
with Eq. (10) indeed yields δωδ t = (β+β−M)−1. However we note that Eq. (21) is a general
expression for the size of the secret key for a TFQKD protocol with arbitrary finite resolution
in both the time and frequency bases, which is not specific to our proposed modulation scheme
and makes no assumptions about the form of the state produced by the source, or the power of
Eve’s interventions.
4. Practical considerations
So far we have considered the security of finite-resolution measurements on photon-pair states,
but the real photonic states emitted by a parametric source contain dominant contributions from
vacuum (no photons emitted), and smaller contributions from multi-pair emission (most signifi-
cantly, four photons emitted instead of two). Multi-pair emission does not necessarily represent
a security threat, since in general the spectral correlations of the source are strictly pair-wise,
meaning that Eve cannot glean extra information by ‘splitting off’ extraneous photons. How-
ever our security proof is based on a representation of the POVMs in the Hilbert space spanned
by a single photon impinging on each detector. The proof is therefore only approximate, but
squashing protocols have been proposed for qubit-based QKD to deal with the effects of multi-
pair emission [61], and a similar idea could be used here by randomly assigning measurement
outcomes whenever more than one detector in an array fires.
Alice and Bob can remove the influence of the vacuum components by post-selecting on joint
detection events, and this also allows the protocol to run when the channel transmission and de-
tector efficiencies are less than unity. For Alice and Bob to use postselection, they must employ
spectral filters and temporal gates that prevent signals entering their detectors with spectral or
temporal components outside the range of their measurements. To see why, suppose that Eve
is capable of performing a very precise projective (non-destructive) frequency measurement on
Bob’s photon. If he goes on to measure in the frequency basis, he will get the same result as
Eve, and if Alice also used the frequency basis, this measurement result will form part of the
sifted key. However, if Bob makes a temporal measurement without any time gate, the narrow-
band photon produced by Eve’s measurement will fall mostly outside of Bob’s detection range
in the time domain, and so will not be detected. Alice and Bob therefore discount this event,
since they are post-selecting events where both parties receive a photon. Mutatis mutandis Eve
can make the same kind of intercept-resend attack in the temporal basis. In this way, Eve can
gain perfect knowledge of the sifted key, while forcing Alice and Bob to ignore those events
where she failed to choose the correct measurement basis. Alice and Bob can prevent this attack
by always rejecting photons occupying regions of chronocyclic space outside the sensitivity re-
gions of their detectors, by means of spectral filters and temporal gates [25]. In our proposed
protocol this could be accomplished with a combination of a dielectric stack and a Pockels cell
preceding each of Alice’s and Bob’s detection systems. See [59] for a more general discussion
of the effects of finite detection range on entanglement verification.
With postselection as described above, non-unit efficiencies and losses do not directly affect
the security, but they reduce the key exchange rate which increases the fraction of uncorrelated
dark counts. As is the case with all other QKD protocols, the increasingly important role of
dark counts as channel losses grow ultimately limits the distance over which TFQKD can be
run securely [62, 10, 55]. To analyse this limitation we consider a simple error model in which
the source joint spectrum produces perfect correlations at Alice’s and Bob’s detectors, while
random errors occur with probability p in either the time or frequency measurements, so that
pBAba =
[
(1− p′)δba+ p′/M
]
/M, (22)
where p′ = Mp/(M− 1). With a dark count probability d for each of the M detectors in any
given run of the photon source, the error probability is found to be (see Appendix B),
p =
κ(M−1)
κM+1
; where κ =
2d(1−η)
η
+Md2
(
1+
1− ε
εη2
)
. (23)
Here η = ηchanηd, with ηchan = e−L/Latt the transmission through a quantum channel of length
L and attenuation length Latt and ηd the overall detector efficiency, assuming Alice and Bob
have identical equipment. We have also introduced the photon-pair emission probability ε such
that the quantum state emitted by the source is approximately given by |0〉+√ε |ψ〉, with
|0〉 the vacuum state and |ψ〉 given in Eq. (1) (see part (a) of Fig. 2). Note that in a typical
implementation with M 1 and {η ,ε}  1, with a small dark count probability d ηε/M,
we have p′ ≈ p≈ 2Md/η . With the error model in Eq. (22) the conditional entropies are both
given by
H˜B|A = HB|A = p log2(M−1)+h(p), (24)
where h(x)=−x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary entropy. Substituting these expressions
into Eq. (21), using δωδ t = 1/β+β−M, one obtains
I ≥ IM−2p log2(M−1)−2h(p)− c, (25)
where we have defined the ‘binning deficit’ c =− log2(2piβ+β−). The security condition I ≥ 0
is of the same form as that derived in [63], which considered QKD with finite dimensional
quantum systems [64]3. Therefore we see that TFQKD, based on the continuous chronocyclic
3Eq. (27) in [63] corresponds to setting I = 0 with c−→ 0, M −→ N and p−→ eNB .
degree of freedom, can be treated as a finite-dimensional QKD protocol, with a small correction
factor represented by c, that takes account of the choices made in binning the measurements.
A realistic joint spectrum, as approximated in Eq. (9), will not exactly produce the simplified
delta-correlated outcome distribution in Eq. (22); in general there will be some finite cross-talk
between adjacent detection channels and a Gaussian-like variation in the marginal detection
probabilities. However we have verified numerically, using Eq. (9), that the choices β+ = 3/4,
β− = 1/5, which we introduced previously, generate HB ≈ IM , and agree with Eq. (24), to
within 0.05 bits, so that Eq. (25) is approximately correct even for a source with a realistic joint
spectral amplitude.
Fig. 2. TFQKD in the presence of losses and noise. (a) The source emits mostly the vacuum
state |0〉, with ε the small probability to emit a correlated photon pair. For simplicity we
consider the source located equidistant from Alice and Bob, connected by lossy channels
of length L with attenuation length Latt. The photon detectors comprising the spectrometers
have efficiency ηd and suffer dark counts with probability d. (b) We compute the secure key
size I as a function of the alphabet size IM for a typical protocol with ε = 0.1, ηd = 25%
(including coupling losses) and d = 10−6, at a distance L = Latt. Dark counts cause a sharp
drop in the secure key size for alphabets larger than 11 bits.
Part (b) of Fig. 2 shows the variation of the secure key size I on the size IM of the alphabet for
a typical implementation with APD-type detectors and a channel length with L= Latt (typically
∼20 km in the C-band), assuming the values of β± used previously. The secure key initially
grows in proportion to the alphabet, albeit with a magnitude reduced by the binning deficit
c ≈ 0.086 bits. Here the deficit is small enough that exchanging up to 4 secure key bits per
detected photon pair remains feasible with the components described previously. However for
IM > 11 (i.e. M > 2048) the secure key decreases and rapidly falls to zero, since the dark count
rate from the growing number of detectors causes significant errors that are attributed to Eve.
This calculation exemplifies a natural technical trade-off in TFQKD, where information can be
extracted rapidly from photon pairs using detector arrays as we propose here, whereas single-
detector protocols extract less information per registered photon pair, but are affected much less
by dark counts [10].
5. Conclusion
We have described an implementation of highly multiplexed time-frequency quantum key dis-
tribution using photon-counting spectrometers and phase modulators to implement frequency
and arrival-time measurements on pairs of spectrally correlated photons by means of time-to-
frequency conversion. We analysed the technical demands required for such a protocol and
found that a large-alphabet detection system is feasible with commercially-available compo-
nents. We developed a general security analysis for continuous-variable QKD protocols with
binned measurement results, and applied it to our protocol to model the effects of dark counts
on the size of the secure key. The protocol we presented is one of a family of time-frequency
protocols well suited to transmission using waveguides and optical fibres, where spatial or po-
larisation mode encoding is vulnerable to cross-talk and differential scattering losses. Highly
multimode quantum light sources are now a well-developed technology, and the use of entan-
gled beams allows the communication distance to be extended via entanglement swapping with
quantum repeaters. Our measurement scheme based on phase modulation represents a compact
and technically straightforward way to demultiplex a large-alphabet key from a multimode en-
tangled light source, which is a convenient source of correlations that removes the need for an
active encoding step. The security analysis we presented shows how the protocol can be treated
as a finite-dimensional QKD scheme, despite the continuous nature of the chronocyclic de-
gree of freedom. We anticipate that these results will influence the next generation of quantum
cryptographic systems.
A. Entropic uncertainty relation for finite-resolution measurements
Fig. 3. Schematic of the operator Π1/2j Π˜
1/2
k , showing the approximate computation of its
largest singular value.
As described in the main text, the complementarity of non-commuting measurements
{Π j},{Π˜k} is manifested by the entropic uncertainty relation in Eq. (16), with the bound
B = −2log2 max jk ||Π1/2j Π˜1/2k ||∞. To compute the singular values of the product Π1/2j Π˜1/2k we
first note that the square-roots can be dropped because for the top-hat-shaped frequency bins
defined in Eq. (3) we have F(ω)1/2 = F(ω). We therefore consider the singular values of the
operator
Π jΠ˜k = (2piφ¨)−1/2
∫ ∫
Fj(ω ′)F˜k(ω ′−ω ′′)
∣∣ω ′〉〈ω ′′∣∣dω ′dω ′′ (26)
=
δω
2piφ¨
∫ ∫
Fj(ω ′)e−iωk(ω
′−ω ′′)/φ¨ sinc
[
δω
2
(ω ′−ω ′′)
φ¨
]∣∣ω ′〉〈ω ′′∣∣dω ′dω ′′.
The phase factor e−iωk(ω ′−ω ′′)/φ¨ can be dropped since this represents a unitary transformation
that does not affect the singular values. Similarly the index j on Fj is arbitrary since this pa-
rameterises a shift in the position of the top-hat function that again does not affect the singular
values. The singular values are thus obtained by considering the Schmidt decomposition of the
two-dimensional function
F (ω ′,ω ′′) =
{
δω
2piφ¨ sinc
[
δω
2
(ω ′−ω ′′)
φ¨
]
|ω ′−ω j| ≤ δω/2;
0 otherwise.
(27)
As shown in Fig. (3), this has the form of a narrow vertical strip cut from a broad diagonal
band, and is well approximated by the factorable function F (ω ′,ω ′′) ≈ λ f (ω ′)g(ω ′′), where
f (ω ′) is a mode function with width δω , g(ω ′′) is a mode function with width 2piφ¨/δω , and
λ =
δω
2piφ¨
×
√
δω
2piφ¨
δω
. (28)
Numerical calculations confirm that this remains an excellent approximation to the largest sin-
gular value of the function in Eq. (27) provided δω/(2piφ¨/δω)< 0.1, which is guaranteed by
Eq. (10) for a large-alphabet protocol with M 1/β+β−. Substituting Eq. (28) into Eq. (20)
and using δ t = δω/φ¨ , we obtain the bound on the secret key given in Eq. (21). We note that the
resulting bound applies quite generally to any TFQKD protocol employing binned frequency
and time measurements with resolutions δω , δ t.
B. Dark count error probability
The error probability p is given by [63]
p =
Pincorrect
Pcorrect+Pincorrect
,
where Pcorrect, Pincorrect are the probabilities for recording correlated and uncorrelated detector
clicks, respectively. Alice and Bob postselect on single clicks at each side, so only events where
one detector fires each are counted. We make the simplifying assumption that if both photons
from a photon pair are successfully emitted and detected, without a dark count occurring in any
other channel, then the two registered outcomes are perfectly correlated. If these photons are
not registered, but dark counts occur, it is possible that the outcomes are incorrectly correlated.
Taking into account all possibilities yields
Pincorrect = d
2(M−1)
[2εηη(M−1)d+ εη2d2M(M−1)+ εd2M(M−1)], (29)
and
Pcorrect = d
2(M−1)
[εη2+2εηηd+ εη2d2M+ εd2M], (30)
where the overbar notation x= 1−x denotes the probabilistic complement. The common factor
of d
2(M−1)
represents the probability that there is no dark count in the M−1 remaining bins on
each side, and this factor cancels out in the expression for p. After some algebra, one obtains
the expressions in Eq. (23).
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